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The present crisis in the Law of the Sea is of vital importance not only
to international lawyers and lawyers generally, but to all citizens of the
United States. It affects the mobility of U.S. naval and air forces, partic-
ularly our nuclear submarines and our aircraft; the development of the
most important available new sources of petroleum and hard minerals at a
time when we are facing an energy crisis and nationalization of traditional
sources of hard minerals; and the availability of animal protein from fish to
feed the world's increasing population. This crisis is leading to escalating
bilateral conflicts between countries because of the increasing importance
of their disagreement over legal rights in the ocean.
This article will review U.S. policy in the light of preparations for the
upcoming 1973 Law of the Sea Conference, emphasizing the unsettled
issues.
I. Background
The present crisis and U.S. policy are best understood in a global and
historic context: The law of the sea in essence comprises the rules govern-
ing the activities of men and nations on the 70% of this planet occupied by
its oceans. Its fundamental premise, the freedom of the seas, goes back to
the 17th Century (1609) when the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius' concept of
the Mare Liberum (free sea) prevailed over the English scholar John
Selden's Mare Clausum (closed sea). It has been the cornerstone of the law
of the sea for the last three and a half centuries.
Today this doctrine is under serious attack. A number of developing
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coastal States assert claims to 200 mile territorial seas. If 200 mile territo-
rial seas were accepted world-wide, more than 30%-up to 50%, according
to the Soviet geographers-of our oceans would cease to be high seas and
would be subject to coastal State sovereignty. In this huge area foreign
states would enjoy only the right of innocent passage: that is, without the
consent of coastal States, there would be no right in this area to overfly or
transit submerged; there would be no right to fish or conduct scientific
research; and no right to engage in exploitation of petroleum and other
mineral resources under an international regime.
It was in response to this challenge and to the fundamental problems
which have produced it, that the United Nations General Assembly in
December 1970 called for a conference on the Law of the Sea, to take
place in 1973 with a view to reaching international agreement on the
outstanding problems.
II. Development of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine
The freedom of the seas doctrine provides in essence that all states have
equal rights to use the high seas, subject to reasonable regard for each
other's use of the seas, and prohibits the establishment of national sover-
eignty over the high seas. From its inception in the 17th Century the
freedom of the seas doctrine was not applied right up to the shore. Princi-
pally because of the defense interest of the coastal state, a 3-mile territorial
seas was generally recognized in which the coastal state was sovereign
subject only to a right of innocent passage for foreign vessels.
The law of the sea remained relatively stable for three and one-half
centuries up to World War i1, and the record of respect for it by states was
remarkable. In the twentieth century the dispute between proponents of a
3-mile territorial sea and the advocates of wider territorial sea limits up to
12 miles, frustrated the achievement of a general international treaty agree-
ment on the precise breadth of the territorial sea; however, there was
unanimous agreement prior to World War 11 that the oceans beyond 12
miles were high seas, and not subject to the territorial jurisdiction of any
state.
III. 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences
Following World War 11, in a monumental effort to codify and develop
the Law of the Sea, the United Nations International Law Commission
prepared four draft conventions with respect to the legal regimes for the
territorial sea, high seas and the continental shelf as well as fisheries
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conservation. These formed the basis for the four conventions adopted at
the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. However, the Confer-
ence was unable to agree on a maximum breadth for the territorial sea, or
for coastal state exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, and was also unable to
agree on a precise seaward limit for coastal state sovereign rights over the
mineral resources of the continental shelf.
Moreover, the Conference did not address the problem of a legal r6gime
for the seabeds beyond national jurisdiction, and adopted only rudimentary
rules with respect to the prevention of ocean pollution. At a further Con-
ference in 1960 held for the purpose of agreeing on the breadth of the
territorial sea, a United States-Canadian proposal for a 6-mile territorial
sea and an additional six miles exclusive fishery zone, failed by one vote to
achieve the necessary two-thirds majority.
Two parallel developments underlie the present crisis in the present law
of the sea: (1) technological advances since World War II leading to new
and more intensive uses of the oceans; and (2) the proliferation of unilater-
al claims to broad maritime jurisdiction by coastal states.
IV. Technological Breakthrough since World War II
Prior to World War 11, navigation and fishing were the principal uses of
the sea. Today we have a technical capacity to employ the oceans for an
increasing variety of uses and with ever-increasing intensity.
We have developed the technology to recover petroleum from the
oceans' seabeds at increasingly greater depths. There is probably as much
petroleum potential under the oceans as on land, with offshore production
already constituting 17% of the total U.S. production, and commercial
production moving out to the 200 meter water depth and beyond.
Manganese nodules lying in large quantities on the deep ocean floor are
rich in nickel, copper and cobalt. Exploratory mining of these nodules has
already taken place, and the technological progress is such that commercial
production of certain of these metals is expected by the end of the decade.
We have developed nuclear submarines and super tankers, and are
developing submersible cargo carriers.
We are catching new stocks of fish and engaging in fish farming, while
distant water fishing states are using highly mechanized fish factory ships
and sophisticated sonar equipment in tracking fish.
We have developed new methods of scientific research in the oceans.
Such research has acquired increasing importance not only with respect to
the oceans and their resources, but with respect to a better knowledge of
our planet, its wealth and its environment.
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We now have the capability to destroy the oceans' capacity to sustain
life by overfishing and pollution and to waste its mineral potential. We also
have the capacity to degrade the marine environment far from where an
ocean activity takes place.
As a result of all these developments, conflicts between different uses of
the same ocean space are developing. For example, seabed drilling and
mining may interfere with navigation and fishing, spills from tankers with
recreation on beaches, and pollution control measures with maritime trade.
In the absence of widely agreed legal rules, increasing bi-lateral conflicts
are occurring between states over various competing uses of the oceans.
V. Unilateral Claims by Coastal States - Partition of the Oceans
Coastal states do have a legitimate interest in exploiting fisheries and
mineral resources off their coasts, and protecting their coastal waters and
beaches from pollution, an interest which the United States shares as a
coastal state. Thus it is understandable that, in the absence of international
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and on fisheries and mineral
resources jurisdiction, coastal states have been asserting wider and more
far-reaching maritime jurisdiction out to 200 miles and beyond. Such action
is no longer limited to Latin America.
Certain Latin American countries have supplied an ideological rationale
for these unilateral claims, by asserting that every state has the right to fix
its maritime jurisdiction within reasonable limits. This is, of course, an
invitation to a partition of the oceans as was attempted by the maritime
powers in the 17th Century.
Moreover, it has become increasingly difficult for other states to enforce
high seas freedoms directly against coastal claims as they did in the past.
Not only are there treaty restrictions on the use of force, but any such
course of action must be weighed against the potential cost in terms of
other foreign policy objectives.
Coastal state claims to wider maritime jurisdiction have escalated since
the failure of the 1960 Conference to reach agreement on the breadth of
the territorial sea and coastal state fisheries jurisdiction. The 1973 Law of
the Sea Conference may well be the last opportunity to accommodate
peacefully the various coastal, maritime and seabed interests which are
presently in conflict.
VI. United States Policy
President Nixon, on March 23, 1970, announced a U.S. oceans policy
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which was designed to accommodate a wide variety of interests. It was
based on the premise that these interests are not necessarily in conflict if
properly analyzed and may be accommodated rather than compromised in
a general international solution.
The basic components of this policy are as follows:
(a) Territorial Sea and Straits
The United States has proposed a move from our present position of a
three mile territorial sea to an agreed twelve mile territorial sea, provided
freedom of transit through and over straits used for international navigation
is guaranteed.
The reason why the United States is insisting on this guarantee of free
transit through and over straits used for international navigation, is that
with the move from a three to a twelve mile territorial sea, international
straits between six and twenty-four miles wide would become overlapped
by territorial seas, and in these straits foreign shipping would only have a
right of innocent passage. The United States Navy and merchant marine
are highly dependent upon unimpeded transit through many of these straits
between six and twenty-four miles in width, and the right of innocent
passage through these straits is no longer a satisfactory guarantee of free
transit.
In the first place, under the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea there
is no right for submerged transit by submarines, or for military overflight of
territorial seas. Secondly, a number of coastal states have interpreted
innocent passage in a subjective way, as permitting them to prevent
passage of certain types of vessels, such as super-tankers or nuclear pow-
ered vessels or because of the nature of the cargo or destination of the
vessel.
(b) Fisheries
The United States recognizes that to achieve a general international
agreement on a twelve mile territorial sea, coastal states must be given
fishing jurisdiction beyond twelve miles. Moreover, the United States' own
coastal fishermen are interested in protection from highly mobile distant
water fishing fleets beyond twelve miles from the coast. On the other hand,
United States distant water fishermen, particularly the tuna fishing and
shrimp industries, are interested in continuing to fish off the coast of other
nations, particularly certain of our Latin American neighbors.
The United States has proposed giving coastal states regulatory jurisdic-
tion and preferential economic rights, based on their capacity to catch, with
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respect to the coastal species of fish adjacent to their coasts as well as
anadromous species such as salmon which spawn in their rivers but swim
far out into the oceans before returning to the rivers where they originate.
These coastal and anadromous species constitute over three-quarters of the
world's fishing catch.
This coastal state jurisdiction would extend as far off shore as the
species ranges. The coastal states' preferential rights would be subject to a
negotiated general agreement on distant water states' traditional fishing
rights. Highly migratory fish, such as tuna, would be under international
and regional rather than coastal state, control.
No single state can adequately manage a migratory species such as tuna
which ranges through the waters of a great number of coastal states, as well
as the high seas, far from any coastal state. On the other hand, in the case
of salmon which spawn in a coastal state's rivers, the very existence of the
species depends upon the coastal state's maintenance of a favorable envi-
ronment in its rivers for these species and the return of a sufficient number
from the high seas to a particular river in order to maintain the species. The
yield of this species, and the restraints necessary to protect their fresh
water spawning environment, can be maximized if they are subject to the
management of the coastal state from which they come, and to which they
will return, if not caught on the high seas.
(c) Seabed Resources
With respect to the exploitation of the seabed's mineral resources, the
United States has proposed an intermediate zone approach-that is, an
area of mixed coastal state and international jurisdiction between the area
of coastal state sovereign rights and a fully international area beyond.
Under the United States proposal, coastal state sovereign rights over the
exploitation of the seabed's petroleum and sedentary fish, such as oysters,
would extend to the edge of the twelve-mile territorial sea, or the 200-me-
ter water depth line, whichever is further seaward. The intermediate zone
would extend from this point to the seaward edge of the geological conti-
nental margin, in which most of the ocean's petroleum deposits are be-
lieved to be located.
The essential purpose of this proposal is to accommodate coastal state
desires, for effective control over the petroleum in the submerged continen-
tal margin off their coast, but at the same time to protect other uses of the
seabed and waters above, to assure minimum global standards of environ-
mental protection, and to provide for some revenue-sharing with the in-
ternational community.
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In order to meet criticism of the United States' proposal by developing
coastal states, particularly those with a narrow continental margin, the
United States has indicated a willingness to consider a mileage outer
boundary of the intermediate zone as well as an outer boundary based on
alternative mileage, depth and geological criteria.
(d) Scientific Research
In our view, scientific research in the oceans is, and should be, beneficial
to all. The United States supports both maximum freedom of scientific
research, and maximum efforts to ensure dissemination of the results of
such research. There is no inherent contradiction between the exercise of
resource jurisdiction by coastal states and freedom of scientific research.
On the contrary, such research can enhance the ability of coastal States to
derive maximum benefits from resources under their jurisdiction.
(e) Environmental Protection
The United States is vigorously seeking to bring ocean pollution under
effective international regulation in a number of different forums. IMCO
has produced several Conventions on pollution from ships, and is contin-
uing this work. Also significant are IMCO's attempts to lessen the chances
of collisions at sea through such measures as traffic separation arrange-
ments. The U.S. has worked for a Convention on ocean dumping, an
environmental monitoring system, an international force for research, as
well as other measures in the context of the 1972 Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment.
The U.S. draft seabed treaty proposes that the international seabed
organization, to be established by the Law of the Sea Conference, be given
broad regulatory and emergency powers in order to prevent pollution
arising from exploration and exploitation, and from all deep drilling, in the
international seabed area.
Also, one essential advantage of an intermediate zone on the seabeds is
that minimum environmental standards can be fixed internationally, thus
better assuring protection of the ocean environment as a whole, assuring
coastal States that they will not suffer competitive economic disadvantage
by applying such standards, and assuring coastal States not only the right
to apply higher standards if they chose, but the right to seek technical
assistance from the international authority in doing so.
VII. Preparations for the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference
In addition to calling for a law of the sea conference in 1973, the United
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Nations General Assembly in December 1970 also called for two meetings
of a preparatory committee to prepare for the conference in 197 1, and two
more meetings in 1972. In the fall of 1972, the General Assembly will
decide on the precise date of the conference and could postpone it. Under
the usual rules, a two-thirds majority will be required at the Conference for
the adoption of a final treaty text.
During the meetings of the preparatory committee, more than 90 coun-
tries have indicated their general views. While the United States has not
agreed with all the views expressed, the development and articulation of
national positions is an important first step in effective multilateral negotia-
tions. Moreover, the discussions to date indicate at least the broad pa-
rameters of a possible eventual agreement consisting of the following
elements:
(a) A 12-mile Territorial Sea.
At the present time, of the 120 coastal states, 70 claim territorial seas of
twelve miles or more (including twelve claiming more than twelve miles up
to 200). This 12-mile figure would appear to be the only figure on which the
possibility of general agreement exists and there has, in fact, been a
growing consensus in support of a 12-mile territorial sea, assuming that
certain other conditions are met at the same time.
Thus, on the one hand, United States willingness to accept a 12-mile
territorial sea is conditioned on recognition of free transit through and over
international straits overlapped by territorial seas. On the other hand, the
willingness of many developing countries to accept a 12-mile territorial sea,
is conditioned on their obtaining adequate control of the resources off their
shore beyond twelve miles.
(b) Freedom of Navigation on the Surface, Submerged
and in the Air Beyond Twelve Miles.
Countries which limit their territorial sea claims to twelve miles, of
course, recognize freedom of navigation and overflight in the oceans be-
yond twelve miles.
Moreover, certain countries that claim 200 mile territorial seas such as
Argentina and Uruguay, have expressly recognized navigational freedoms
beyond twelve miles. Most other states claiming 200 miles have indicated
their willingness to recognize such freedoms beyond twelve miles, as part
of a general law of the sea settlement if their jurisdiction out to 200 miles
over resources (and in some cases for other limited purposes) is recog-
nized.
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Freedom of navigation and overflight beyond twelve miles is, of course,
vitally important to our naval mobility and operations, particularly that of
our nuclear submarines and aircraft.
(c) Coastal State Economic Jurisdiction.
The vast majority of states have indicated a willingness to recognize
some form of coastal state economic jurisdiction beyond twelve miles, as
part of an overall law of the sea agreement. There remain significant
differences as to the limits of coastal state economic jurisdiction as well as
its content.
(d) International Legal Rgime for the Seabed
beyond Coastal State Economic Jurisdiction.
In December 1970, at the same time the 1973 law of the sea conference
was called, the UN General Assembly adopted, with no negative votes, a
Declaration of Principles for an international r6gime for the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction. These principles are the basis for the preparation of
treaty provisions on the international seabed r6gime to be agreed at the
1973 Law of the Sea Conference.
The Soviet Union and a number of Eastern European countries ab-
stained from voting on this Declaration, principally because of their oppo-
sition to the principles relating to sharing of revenues from seabed mineral
exploitation with the internation community and the establishment of an
international organization with a role in administering the international
r6gime for the seabed. However, in subsequent meetings of the preparatory
committee, the Soviet Union has indicated that it is now prepared to
accept, as part of a general package in which its navigational and other
objectives are satisfied, some form of revenue sharing as well as in-
ternational machinery.
The key unsettled issues on which the success or failure of the 1973
Conference will doubtless hinge are the following:
(1) How far beyond 12 miles should coastal state economic jurisdiction
extend, and should it be exclusive or subject to international standards and
accountability?
Many developing coastal states are urging the adoption of a 200-mile
exclusive resource zone, in which the coastal state will have complete and
exclusive jurisdiction over both the mineral resources of the seabed and
fisheries. Other states have been urging narrower limits on the coastal state
jurisdiction, particularly the distant water fishing states such as the Soviet
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Union, United Kingdom and Japan, with respect to coastal state fishing
jurisdiction, and the landlocked and shelf-locked countries with respect to
coastal state jurisdiction over the seabeds' mineral resources.
The United States has been particularly concerned with protecting other
uses such as navigation, overflight and freedom of scientific research in any
area over which coastal state economic jurisdiction is recognized. In addi-
tion, for the reasons set forth earlier under "United States Policy-
Fisheries," the United States has opposed subjecting highly migratory
oceanic fish such as tuna, to coastal state jurisdiction and has proposed
coastal state jurisdiction over salmon, from a coastal state's rivers through-
out their migratory range on the high seas.
In general, the United States has urged that coastal states' interest in
control over the resources off their coast, be reconciled with the in-
ternational community's interest in other uses of the area, in which these
resources are located; and that this objective can be achieved most
effectively by the delegation to coastal states, of resource management
jurisdiction subject to international standards, protecting other uses of the
area and the marine environment.
Coastal states compliance with these international standards would be
subject to compulsory dispute settlement. It has also been our view that
revenues for the international community as a whole from seabed miner-
als, will not be very meaningful unless payments for this purpose are made,
not only with respect to the deep seabed exploitation of the hard minerals
contained in manganese nodules, but also, al. least in some measure, with
respect to the exploitation of the petroleum and gas resources of the
continental margin beyond the 200 meter depth line.
(2) Free transit through and over international straits.
The United States' objective of achieving an international guarantee of
free transit through and over straits used for international navigation has
been suppotted by other maritime states, such as the United Kingdom,
France, the USSR and a limited number of developing countries such as
Argentina, Ethiopia and Singapore. On the other hand, it has been strongly
opposed by Spain and a number of other straits states. The great majority
of developing countries which are not straits states have taken no position
on this issue.
The United States has stressed the fact that we are seeking a limited
right solely for the purpose of transit of straits. This right would not permit
a transiting vessel to engage in other activities while in transit, as it could
on the high seas. We understand and will seek to accommodate the con-
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cerns of coastal states with respect to navigational safety and pollution.
However, these concerns should be accommodated through international
arrangements, rather than giving the coastal state discretion, which could
interfere with the substance of the right of free transit.
The United States has also stressed the desirability, in terms of avoiding
international conflict, of preventing a situation in which coastal state dis-
cretionary control of transit, would in effect create a series of crisis points
like the Berlin corridor throughout the world, in which straits' states would
be subject to both international and domestic pressure with respect to the
exercise of their discretion in permitting transit.
(3) Nature of international regime and machinery in the area beyond
coastal state economic jurisdiction.
Among the key issues which the Declaration of Principles for the seabed
beyond coastal state economic jurisdiction did not resolve, are the powers
of the international agency established to administer the regime. A number
of developing countries have suggested that the international agency should
have concurrent or exclusive authority to engage directly in the ex-
ploitation of resources. The United States and a number of other devel-
oped countries have suggested that the international agency limit itself to
licensing states or enterprises sponsored by states, inspecting and regu-
lating their activities and collecting revenues for the international commu-
nity.
The United States has indicated concern at the extent of the investment
and bureaucracy that would be required if the international agency itself
were to engage in deep-sea mining. The interest of developing countries in
participating directly in exploitation and developing their technological
capabilities, could be met through technical assistance from the in-
ternational agency and participation in joint ventures.
A number of developing countries have also urged that the international
agency have the authority to regulate prices and production. Dr. Vincent
McKelvey, the Director of the United States Geological Survey, has
indicated that, with the possible exception of cobalt, the projected increase
in world demand is such that any significant adverse impact on the econo-
my of land producers is highly improbable. In any event control of produc-
tion and prices with respect to seabed mining would not achieve its objec-
tives, unless there were also controls applied to existing and potential
land-based production.
Almost all of the proposals for the international agency for the seabed
contemplate the establishment of an agency, with significant rule-making
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and regulatory authority with respect to the exploration and exploitation of
seabed minerals.
They have agreed on an assembly in which all member states would
participate and a smaller representative council which would exercise most
of the rule-making and regulatory authority. However, a crucial issue is the
composition of the council. The United States has indicated that to the
extent that this council is given significant regulatory powers, the more
industrially developed states, whose activities will be most affected, will
require a voting structure that protects their interests, if the legislature and
peoples of such countries are to be persuaded to agree to the international
r6gime and machinery. A number of developing countries have indicated
that, in their view, there can be no deviation from the one-vote-one-nation
principle, although some are proposing different criteria for balanced mem-
bership and more that a simple majority for decision-making; the Soviet
Union has proposed that decisions be reached by consensus.
Further discussion and negotiation with respect to these issues is re-
quired in order to develop a satisfactory accommodation.
(4) Coastal state pollution jurisdiction beyond twelve miles.
A number of coastal states have urged that pollution jurisdiction should
accompany coastal state resource jurisdiction, in the area beyond a 12-mile
territorial sea. This will doubtlessly continue to be an important area of
discussion and negotiation.
In some areas there seems to be a large measure of agreement. Coastal
state jurisdiction over marine pollution emanating from land is clear. More-
over, it seems generally understood that coastal state economic jurisdic-
tion over seabed resources, including such jurisdiction in an intermediate
zone, will include coastal state controls over pollution from exploration and
exploitation of such resources. The issue is the extent to which such
controls should be subject to international standards, inspection, and dis-
pute settlement, including minimum standards promulgated by the in-
ternational seabeds organization for this purpose.
There is difficulty in dealing with the question of pollution from vessels.
On the one hand, the interest of coastal states in protection from such
pollution is clear. On the other hand, the international interests in freedom
of navigation could be seriously compromised by coastal state controls
over vessels and their movements. Moreover, the fact that vessels by their
very nature move over large distances, tends to raise serious practical
questions regarding the effectiveness and harmonization of different coastal
state measures.
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
1973 Law of the Sea Conference
At present, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
is very active in the field of preventing pollution from vessels by agreed
international arrangements, and has produced a number of Conventions on
the subject. With respect to IMCO's future activities in this area, at least
two problems must be addressed:
First, the role of I MCO in continuing to develop international standards,
and the extent to which this role needs strengthening to protect the in-
terests of coastal states.
Second, whether additional measures for international cooperation in
enforcement are desirable, and the extent to which these should involve
IMCO, coastal states, or both.
VIII. Prospects for 1973 Conference
While there may not be full preparation, it would be a serious mistake
for the next General Assembly to postpone the Conference beyond 1973.
Technical preparation is useful, but it is more important to the success of
the Conference that governments begin to take the hard political decisions
on which a consensus may be based. Delay would only increase the
difficulty, particularly if unilateral claims proliferate. On the one hand,
coastal states will become impatient to control their offshore resources,
while on the other hand the development of deep sea mining capability by
the more technologically advanced countries will be proceeding apace.
If the broad lines of a consensus begin to emerge this year, the technical
preparation and resolution of procedural issues on the preparatory com-
mittee would be facilitated.
In carrying on these negotiations, the United States Government needs
the counsel and support of the U.S. industries and other interests affected,
including the general public. We have attempted to achieve this both
through a formal broadly-based advisory committee and informally through
discussion and conferences with many different groups.
There is hardly a time in history when the world was in greater need of
general respect for international law and institutions. The present crisis in
the law of the sea-the heart of international law as we have known it for
almost three centuries-presents a serious threat. The law of the sea must
be modernized by general international agreement, or it will give way to a
partition of the oceans and contribute to a disintegration of international
law generally. On the other hand, this crisis represents a challenge: If the
international community could develop effectively functioning international
law and institutions for the oceans, this could lead to greater reliance on
such law and institutions generally.
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